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 The German welfare-state has been under pressure for some time, resulting in 
more changes and more uncertainty about its future development. Are pensions 
still secure, how can we create more jobs, and how can the spread of poverty be 
curtailed? In addition to these classical questions of welfare-state policy there are 
also some new aspects: should there be more decentralisation? Is the educational 
system still adequate in the post-industrial era? What about the position of 
women and the gender dimension in the welfare-state? There are other questions 
dealing with the feasibility of public policy, such as: are the agreed reforms really 
reforms, or instead are they cost cutting measures and are these policies only 
introduced to secure the power of the governing parties and elites? Finally, in 
view of the globalisation of the world economy, is there any room left for politics 
to determine public policy or are these changes only a 'Defizitflucht' (escape from 
deficits, Luhmann)? 
 
 Of course, considerations like these are not only limited to Germany, but are 
common in all developed industrial societies and even in the quickly emerging 
economies of Southeast Asia and Latin America (Kuhnle 2000, Alber 2000). We do 
not want to undertake a strictly application-orientated search for the best 
practices and successful models, but rather analyse the German case against the 
background of comparative research on welfare-states (Heinze/Schmid/Strünck 
1999, Leibfried/Wagschal 2000). This methodological approach seems especially 
helpful in order to evaluate measures with regard to their political implications 
and to catagorise the results in a theoretical framework. 
 
 Therefore, in this issue we want to present comparative studies of specific 
areas or problems of the welfare-state. This brings up the first question: do 
something like coherent national types à la Esping-Andersen still exist, and must 
Germany always be classified as a conservative, corporative type, or should 
politically and theoretically relevant differences and similarities be examined 
along policy lines (Freeman 1985, Peter/Cole 2000)? This question also applies to 
a specific level of policy on which a study concentrates. For example, there are 
hints that there is a 'local' logic at the community level. It might be that the 
developments of core areas of the German welfare state – the system of social 
insurances – follow paths other than the periphery (e.g. social assistance, 
education, gender or communities). Furthermore, in most contributions in this 
issue we follow qualitative methods instead of a quantitative analysis of aggregate 
data. Not least because of a lack of hard data in many policy areas and for the 
question of innovation and trends of development (or rather a disruption in those 





 A second theme in this issue is the broad concept of the welfare-state. This 
means that not only the central aspects of the welfare-state will be examined, like 
social insurance, additional areas like social assistance, labour-market policy, 
but also socio-political activities on the local level will not be neglected. Here, 
somewhat parallel and somewhat complementary relationships to the traditional 
social policy are evolving. Compared to the conventional perspective of welfare-
state comparison (Schmid 1996/2001) a strategy of re-commodification in these 
rather marginal areas has been recently observed. Here there is an attempt to 
activate people and re-integrate them into the labour-market. In the German case 
there have been at least in some fields and partly on the sub-national level, 
interesting, innovative reforms, which might put the often lamented blockades of 
reform into perspective. At the same time these reforms overlap the old division of 
social-democratic and conservative policies. The expansion of the study´s 
framework (especially with the inclusion of education and gender-policy) leads to 
shifts in the assessment and e.g. casts the liberal model and its measures in a 
more favourable light. 
 
 Six contributions try to develop these conceptual and methodological ideas. 
First, Hülsmann, Schmid, and Schöll look at the traditional core of the German 
model, the pension insurance. They compare specific characteristics and recent 
reforms in six Western European countries and conclude that a high degree of 
path dependency and respectively limited reform has taken place in Germany. 
Secondly, Fuhrmann deals with the situation of women in the German welfare-
state and observes that a considerable backwardness exists with comparison to 
Denmark. In their analysis of welfare to work strategies which are part of social 
assistance reform Woods, Chadwick, and Volkert conclude that, compared to the 
U.S., incentives in Germany are small. However, the downside of activation and 
re-commodification becomes clear as these measures also have elements of 
coercion and reduction of benefits. Blanke and Schridde take a closer look at the 
sub-national level and deal with the local welfare-state. In an English-German 
comparison they discover a substantial but almost hidden change. Hega and 
Hokenmaier move even further away from the field of  the conventional welfare-
state and examine the educational system in Western countries. This puts the 
liberal cases into a better light, whereas conservative regimes such as Germany 
come off rather badly. Finally, Cox discusses the question why Germany´s ability 
for reform is lower than in neighbouring Denmark and the Netherlands, which 
are praised as good examples. 
 
 A colourful picture of Germany´s situation is developed in this series and it 
makes sense to organise the hypotheses of the contributors along three 
dimensions. On one axis we find the examined policy areas ordered into a 
continuum ranging from rather conventional (pension) to rather unconventional 
(education). On the second axis we have the level of research starting with the 
international and national levels down to the local level of the welfare-state. 
Finally, the third axis shows the intensity of reforms: continuity and path-
dependency vs. innovation capability. It may be difficult to actually illustrate this 
concept but there seems to be a tendency to identify somewhat more reforms if 
the study is undertaken in the periphery of the German welfare-state. The data 
used here is mostly qualitative with only few best practice cases in the sample of 
compared countries. This teaches us to be careful with such interpretations and 




 This series shows that modern welfare-states are multi-dimensional objects 
and that research approaches like those above are a viable and necessary way of 
differentiating between different levels and areas of welfare-state policy. Such 
complexity also becomes clear when one looks at the structure of the German 
welfare-state, which is characterised by social insurances financed through 
employer and employee contributions and institutional fragmentation. 
Furthermore, the social budget is considerably high and still growing (see tables 
below, Schmid 2000). 
 
Figure 1: The structure of the German welfare-state 
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Table 1: Germany´s social budget 1960-99 
 
 Social budget; payments in percentage of GNP 









1960 21,7 9,6 6 3,6 0,6 1,9 
1965 23,3 10 6,5 4,3 0,5 1,8 
1970 26 11 7,5 4,7 0,9 1,8 
1975 33,4 13,3 10 5,2 2,3 2,6 
1980 32,2 12,8 10,3 4,9 2 2,3 
1985 31,4 12,6 10 4,2 2,5 2 
1990 29 11,7 9,8 3,7 2,5 1,2 
1995 33,5 12,2 11 4,2 4,2 1,3 
1999 33,5 12,4 11 4,6 4,2 1,3 
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PENSION-REFORMS IN SIX WEST-EUROPEAN 




Joachim Hülsmann, Josef Schmid, and Sarah Schöll 






 In recent years most European countries have implemented reforms of the 
pension system but the scope and the direction of these reforms have been 
different. This article compares the characteristics of pensions systems in six 
European countries: Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Great Britain, France, 
and Germany in order to analyse recent reform strategies. We could document a 
trend towards diversification in pension systems and observed that the previously 
distinct models of Esping-Andersen´s 'three worlds' have become hazier. Our 
research does not point to convergence of these systems, however. Most systems 
follow an incremental strategy where fundamental reforms are seldom. We 
conclude that the countries may learn from each other but it is necessary for them 
to account for their individual national and systemic backgrounds. Thereby the 
focus of pension reform research should be placed on aims and strategies rather 
than on specific measures of a given reform. 
 
 
Social security systems in all European countries are facing enormous 
challenges because of their extensive social, demographic and economic changes 
(see Kaufmann 1997; Schmid 2000). Especially the pension-system, one of the 
major pillars of social security, has felt these challenges: 
 
• Because of a growing number of pensioners combined with a high number 
of unemployed, and consequently fewer contributors, there have been 
higher expenses. Indeed, a decreasing number of people who pay 
contributions have to support an increasing number of payment-receivers, 
and this trend will even intensify in the future. For Germany it is 
estimated that the ratio between pensioners and payers will grow from 
30% (1991) to 42,5% (2000) and even up to 60,6% for 2030. 
• Further problems arise when these pension-systems have to be adjusted 
because of the changing structures of employment (e.g. a growing number 
of part-time employment and precarious employment-situations]. 
 
All European countries face these fundamental problems in their pension 
systems but because these countries have different national and socio-economic 
structures, they handle these problems in different ways (Bonoli 2000). It is 
necessary to examine the reforms in these countries closely. Therefore we 
describe the architecture of the welfare regimes in general, the pension-system in 
detail, and the current general reforms. Here we focus on Sweden, Denmark, the 




In our analysis we are guided by the following basic theoretical and 
methodological approaches: 
 
1. According to the current trends in comparative welfare-state analyses we 
distinguish between different types or regimes that have evolved over time 
and which were categorised by Esping-Andersen as “social-democratic”, 
“conservative” or “liberal”. An important older typology distinguishes 
between “Bismarck” and Beveridge” systems (Schmid 2000, 2001; Schmidt 
2001). Both of these regime typologies tend to be stable or path-dependent 
where the status quo is the best prediction for the future. 
2. We also take into account the findings of comparative public policy 
analysis (see Schmidt 1993), which states that reforms can be 
implemented depending on their content, their scope, the veto-players and 
the institutional restrictions. Systems like Germany, which are strongly 
federalist and corporatist tend to have only small corridors for reform (see 
also Cox in this volume). 
3. Also considered in this study are the distribution-systems among 
generations and other parts of modern welfare-states.  
4. Finally, our methodological design follows a similar system design in which 
the cases show similar political and socio-economic structures. Therefore 
we concentrate on the already listed EU member-states and exclude other 
interesting cases like Switzerland, Japan or the USA. 
 
In this respect two questions are crucial for our study: First, are 
fundamental reforms possible even when they faced resistance and blockades? 
Second, is it possible for Germany to learn from other countries’ experiences? 
 
 
1. Pension-Systems in Europe in the 1990´s 
 
1.1 Basic Types and Variants  
 
In principal, pension-systems in Europe can be distinguished into two 
major groups (Kohl 1988): 
 
- systems financed through contribution and 
- so-called ”basic” or public pension systems 
 
The first group was devised mainly from Bismarck´s principle of Age- and 
Invalidity-Protection (1889). The central aim of this type of pension is to secure 
the employed population in old age. Pensions are claimed by individuals. One 
characteristic of this system is the so-called “generation-contract” (Kolb 1985): 
the pension systems are financed by contributions and are normally allocation 
systems, also called PAYG (pay as you go). The contributions are used directly to 
satisfy the pension claims of the prior generation, thus there is a balance 
between the generations. Bismarck-type social security is primarily aimed at a 
high degree of security during retirement for (dependent) employees. With 
income-dependent retirement payments pensioners should be able to more or 
less maintain their former standard of living. 
 
Welfare-states á la Beveridge are characterised by universal entitlement. 
Every citizen receives security via a basic social safeguard, which is independent 
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from their former occupation and income. In most cases benefits are not means-
tested. So, this system is a public welfare system in which the state guarantees a 
minimum level of income that is tax-financed. Employment is not a condition for 
getting benefits as it is in the case of contribution financed systems. 
 
Within these types different systems can vary significantly in the scope of 
benefits and services. Because of recent reforms the dividing line between those 
two types is blurred. Nonetheless the original orientation of Beveridge or Bismark 
exists still in its main features and is of importance for reform-options.  
 
Another dimension was introduced by Esping-Andersen in his 
presentation of the “three worlds of welfare” (1990). He distinguishes three basic 
types of welfare states reflecting their political base: the social-democratic, the 
liberal and the conservative welfare-state with the following characteristics: 
 
1) social-democratic welfare-state: 
- universal security is on a high level 
- financing is collective (mostly by taxes) 
- reallocation-impact is high 
- protection from economic or structural crisis is good 
2) liberal welfare-state: 
- this type is consistent with the market; the state intervenes only 
minimally 
- private provision has the primacy 
- a selective pittance-principle for individual emergencies  
- the standard of benefits is low 
3) conservative welfare-state: 
- coverage of the economically active population 
- individual claims under the terms of the achievement principle 
- there is a additional system for minimum-coverage depending on need 
- the level of the benefits is medium 
 
1.2  Selected variations of pension systems (end of the 90s) 
a) Sweden 
 
Until today the Swedish pension system is a universal welfare-system that 
can be categorised as social-democratic (see Esping-Andersen 1990). Everyone 
can receive the basic pension, and only additional contributions (max. 55% of the 
basic pension + housing benefits) are means-tested. The system consists of two 
pillars, the basic pension and a general additional pension (see European 
Commission 2000 and DRV 1999). 
 
• Every citizen is entitled to receive the basic pension. If one has lived in 
Sweden for more than 40 years, or if one has been employed in Sweden for 
more then 30 years, the basic pension is paid off in full. There are also 
possibilities to receive additional benefits. Furthermore, the payments depend 
on the marital status and is annually adjusted to inflation. 
• In addition to the basic pension a supplementary pension can be received 
starting since the 1960s. The payments of this pension depend on the average 
income. Every employee who received an income and paid taxes for more than 
30 years receives a general additional pension up to a limit of 60% of his or 
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her income. The importance of this additional pension has increased since the 
1990s and its finance-volume has recently has risen noticeably higher than 
that of the basic pensions.  
• Beside these contributions there are also occupational and private pension 
schemes. About half of the Swedish pensioners receive such pension-
payments, but the financial volume is only 15% of the total pension-volume.  
 
Payments are relatively high, as the pensions reach about 65 to 85% of the 
previous income. Poverty among pensioners is very low because of the universal 
character of the basic pension. However, the increasing importance of the 






The Danish pension system is mainly financed by taxes and also shows a 
universal character and a high level of benefits. During the last decade the 
system has evolved to a system that is based on four pillars. These are:  
 
• the public pension (plus supplement) 
• additional labour market pension (ATP) 
• occupational pension 
• private pension insurance 
 
Public pension and additional labour market pension form the public part 
and guarantee a basic social security on a high level. The occupational and 
private pensions lie in the responsibility of the social partners respectively in that 
of every individual employee.  
 
Public pension in Denmark can be received at the age of 67. The public 
pension, additional supplements and additional pensions are fully liable for 
taxation. Those who have lived in Denmark for at least three years between the 
age of 15 and 67 are entitled to get a public pension. To qualify for the full 
pension one must have lived in Denmark for at least forty years between the age 
of 15 and 67, otherwise pensions are proportionally reduced. In addition to the 
public pension, there are income-dependent pension-supplements and other 
additional payments. 
 
The ATP was introduced in 1964. Every employee between 16 and 66 is 
obliged to take part in it. The entitlement is not dependent on the income but on 
the life-working-time. A full pension requires that contributions have been made 
in total since 1964; the payments of the additional pension normally start at the 
age of 67 but can be suspended for three years. Thereby the additional pension 
will grow every six months by 5%. Employees at the age of 60 and older who have 
been in the system for a considerable time can receive a part-pension. The 
weekly working time is then reduced and part of the loss of income is 
compensated by the ATP. This part-pension is not financed by contributions but 
by taxes. 
 
The newly created occupational pension system is financed by income-
dependent contributions. The specific conditions are regulated by local collective 
10 
 
bargaining between the employees and the employers. The government 
supervises the pension-funds and the insurance companies, which administrate 
the occupational pension schemes. The private pension insurance plays only a 




c) The Netherlands 
 
The Dutch pension system organised along the providence-principle, but it 
does not match the criteria of the classical universal model. It is a mixed system, 
which can be characterized as social-conservative. The level of pension payments 
is higher the longer contributions to the system have been made. The basic 
pension is paid to every inhabitant and does not depend on the amount of 
contributions but on the length of time these contributions were paid. The model 
is organised in three pillars:  
 
• The first pillar is the general insurance system, which is financed by 
contributions from earned income. This system includes a basic pension, 
which is financed in a pay-as-you-go way, in which every inhabitant up to 
the age of 65 years, independent from his/her earned income, is obliged to 
pay contributions, which is momentarily a rate of 20%.  
• The level of pensions is connected with the net minimum wage: for 
individuals the pension is 70% per person, for couples it is 50% per 
person of the net minimum wage. Benefit recipients with a partner below 
the age of 65 are entitled to a supplement, if the partner has a low income. 
The full pension amounts to double the basic pension of a married person. 
50 years of insurance are required in order to get a full pension. If the 
insurance period is shorter, the pension is reduced by 2% for every year 
that is missing.  
• As the second pillar of the system, company pensions play an important 
role in addition to the general insurance system. This is also reflected by a 
membership of about 94% of the population (Stillich 1996b). The public 
basic pension and the company pensions amount to about 70% of the last 
gross salary. 
• The importance of private pension insurances as a third pillar is only less 
significant due to the importance of the first two.  
 
In the Netherlands the regular pension starts normally at the age of 65. 
Pensions are fully liable for taxation, but taxation only starts if the fixed 
minimum income is exceeded.  
 
d) Great Britain 
 
In Great Britain we find a welfare system á la Beveridge based on a 
national pension system with a low level of benefits. It is composed of a basic 
pension rent charge and an income dependent supplementary pension 
(Supplementary Earnings Related Pension Schemes SERPS). In the past few 
years employees have had the possibility to take part in an additional pension 
system instead of SERPS. The importance of the company and private pension 
insurances has increased during recent years. The pension system has been 
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increasingly privatised and is therefore increasingly dominated by capital-
covering procedures (Kolb 1985) and to a lower degree by allocation procedures. 
 
The public pension system is organised in three parts: the basic pension, the 
income-dependent supplementary pension and the proportional pension.  
 
• The basic pension covers nearly all employees and self-employed. The level 
of payments depends on the duration of contributions and is altogether 
very low. Between 39 and 44 years of payment are needed to be entitled to 
the full basic pension, otherwise the payments are cut. Periods of time can 
be counted (up to a certain extent) toward pension when used for 
childcare or elderly care.  This is also the case in temporary disability, 
illness or unemployment. A partner and children are entitled for financial 
support through the recipient of benefit who gets supplements in addition 
to the basic pension.  
• A pensioner’s benefits in the SERPS depend on his/her former 
contributions. Contributions are supported on the incomes which lie 
between a lower and an upper limit. Payments are calculated according to 
the 20 highest annual incomes and they amount to a maximum of 120 
GBP per week.  
• The proportional pension is contribution-dependent and only applies to 
payments made before 1976. Therefore, it has long lost its importance and 
indeed, the maximum individual payments are very low.  
 
Every pension and retirement payment is seen as an income and is 
therefore liable for taxation. A progressive taxation of the gross income occurs. 
With the age of the recipient the tax allowance increases. No social insurance 
contribution needs to be made for retirement payments. The retirement age for 
men is normally 65 years, for women it is 60. In the years from 2010 to 2020 the 




Because of the multitude of occupation-dependent subsystems the French 
pension system is very complex. It is based on the amount and duration of 
contributions and is therefore equivalent to the conservative Bismarck model. 
One has to distinguish between the general pension insurance and the obligatory 
supplementary pension insurance (for employees, self-employed, public servants, 
unemployed, trainees and students). Starting from a certain minimum-level 
pensions are liable for taxation.  
 
A full basic pension can be received at the age of 60 if contributions have 
been made for a minimum of 40 years as of 2003. However, in most cases 
employees have to continue working to reach 40 years of employment. Starting 
with 60 years of age the employees have the possibility to receive a part-time 
pension. Special systems of social security exist for the self-employed, farmers 
and civil servants. 
  
In the compulsory insurance the pension level depends on the amount of 
insurance-years and is calculated on the basis of the 15 best annual incomes 
(from 2008 on the best 25 annual incomes). If the highest rate is reached, the 
retirement payments cover 50% of an individual reference income, which is 
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calculated from the average annual gross income up to a certain upper limit. The 
system is financed by contributions made by employers and employees and by 
governmental subsidies. Very family-friendly is a regulation by which payments 
are raised by 10% if three or more children were present in the family. Here, a 
strong horizontal redistribution takes place.  
 
The company pension schemes can be divided into a system for executives 
and a system for other employees. They are based on operational and regional 
regulations between trade unions and employers associations.  
 
f) Germany  
 
The German pension system represents the classic social security system 
in accordance with the Bismarck principle. Its aim is the security of the working 
population and an equivalence of benefits and payments (equivalence principle). 
The advantage of such a system is the maintenance of a certain standard of 
living for the pensioners. The disadvantage is likewise obvious: the great 
dependency on employment and the danger of poverty during retirement for 
persons with an irregular and a short history of employment during their 
working-life. By this redistribution does not take place, alone the temporarily 
shifted financing allows a slight balance. According to the “generation contract” 
the working population finances the pensions of the older generation (Kolb 1985). 
Civil servants, self-employed, craftsmen and farmers, as well as other smaller 
professions are not included in the regular pension insurance but have a special 
system of social security.  
 
In the regular pension insurance the level of pensions equal the level of 
previously made contributions; early retirements are possible but only with 
losses in the pension. The pension equals about 50% of the net wage and is 
regularly paid from the age of 65 and onwards. The system is financed by equal 
contributions of employers and employees. Due to demographic changes the 
contributions do not cover the pension demands of the older generation any 
longer. The evolving deficit is covered by tax-revenue and by a reduction of 
payments. 
 
Company pension plans are, like private pension insurances, voluntary. 
However, there are a number of (tax) benefits for private insurance measures, in 
particular for the real estate sector. The company or private insurance systems 
are organised and financed privately and are not or only in some parts restricted 
by legal guidelines, like the transfer of claims after a change of the jobs.  
 
 
1.3 The comparative dimension of the statutory pension insurance 
systems 
 
The following criteria can be derived from the typology of Esping-Andersen 
and can be adopted to the pension systems in the examined countries:  
 
• mode of financing 
• restriction of the recipients of benefits 
• the level of the benefits 
• means-testing for the minimum pension 
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• requirements for the receipt of benefits 
• redistributional impact of the systems 
 
Modes of Financing  
 
Most countries with a social-democratic welfare system finance their basic 
pension by taxes. Additional pension systems are financed by contributions; but 
as there are no individually acquired rights and as the contributions have no 
upper limit, they have the effect of additional taxes. This is true for Sweden, 
Denmark and partly also the Netherlands, but the latter is an exception because 
financing of the basic pension and additional retirement payments is carried out 
by the employees. On the other hand, a universal minimum benefit is guaranteed 
for all and the contributions have to be paid in a similar fashion as would taxes. 
The liberal system shows characteristics of private precaution measures and 
stand in the tradition of pittance-distributors. The state only steps in if the 
private precautions are insufficient and it so guarantees a minimum level of 
security. The financing by taxes reflects the universal principle of this system. 
Conservative Bismarck-systems are marked by their own kind of financing. The 
contributions are partly made by the employees and partly by the employers. The 
individual entitlement for the later benefits arises from the amount of individual 
contributions. A basic retirement payment is not guaranteed within the system; 
thus requirements have to be covered from outside. If the contributions do not 
equal the claims of a generation of pensioners, the state has to pay tax-financed 
subsidies. This is true for the classical model of the German pension system, but 
with modifications also for France. 
 
Level of benefits: Minimum pension or a protection of the living standard  
 
Indicators for the level of benefits are both the minimum pension standard 
and the (average) wages substitute rate. In the basic social safeguard systems all 
citizens are entitled to benefits, whereas the level of the benefits can vary. 
Sweden and the Netherlands provide a high level, which secures a high living 
standard, but which also needs additional insurance to provide a real wage 
replacement. Denmark is also aiming to secure a maintenance of the living 
standard by a basic social security. This is why Denmark provides the highest 
level of the guaranteed benefits. As a counter-example Great Britain provides the 
lowest level of social security benefits; here the benefits are rudimentary (see 
Kohl 1988). France provides a basic social security for every insurance member, 
which secures a medium level of existence. Germany shows only a low level of 
security, if general social benefit payments are taken into account. Apart from 
that, there is no system to prevent old-age poverty. In auxiliary-pension systems 
and pension insurance systems the claims are connected to an occupation, 
which can create problems with respect to a sufficient pension-level. The major 
aim is not the prevention of old-age poverty, but the protection of the living 
standard of the employed once they have become pensioners. The level can be 
balanced as in Sweden, where uniform contributions are made and a lump sum 
is paid, or an auxiliary-pension is paid efficiency-oriented, which means the 
claims are closely connected to the contributions made.  
 




From the logic of the model in social-democratic countries there should be 
no means-testing that is also the case for those countries which have a Beveridge 
system. Their aim is a minimum guarantee for the majority of the population, at 
least in terms of the existence-minimum. Sweden and Denmark show some 
exemptions: Here means-testing exists in some cases. In conservative systems, 
organised like a social-state, there is also an examination of income, especially if 
the person was not employed and is therefore not a member of the system of the 
pension insurance.  
 
Requirements for the receipt of benefits 
 
The requirements for the acquisition of benefits vary in the different 
countries. In this area the social and systemic differences become very obvious. 
Yet they have some features in common. In the social-democratic countries the 
place of residence is very important, in conservative countries it is occupation 
(France) or the employee-status (Germany). The payments normally start 
between the age of 60 in France and 67 in Denmark. However, in nearly all 
countries the employees have the chance for early retirement and part-time 
pensions. However, the later the pension payments start, the higher is the level 
of benefits. Conversely, the pensions are cut partly if the retirement starts early. 
 
Redistributional impact of the systems 
 
All countries show both a vertical and horizontal redistribution. A 
horizontal redistribution takes place between individuals and couples, employed 
and unemployed or between generations, the vertical distribution is related to 
income-differences. However, in Sweden, the Netherlands and France the 
horizontal redistribution takes mostly place between individuals and couples 
(with children), while in Great Britain and Denmark the reallocation exists more 
between employed and unemployed. In Germany there is a strong horizontal 
redistribution among the generations, but hardly any in a vertical dimension. 
The Netherlands, France and Germany show a medium level of redistribution, 
because the entitlements to pension payments are individual; the other examined 
countries show a high level of redistribution, both in a vertical and horizontal 
dimension. This is also true for Great Britain, where the basic pension system 
promote a strong reallocation, but only on a low level.  
 
 
1.4 Private insurances and company pensions in comparison- a 
necessary appendix 
 
The private insurance systems can be divided into two types: the classic 
private insurance under the terms of the capital-covering system (Neumann 
1986) and company pensions. In this section only the latter shall be examined. 
These company pension systems can be divided into obligatory and private 
systems (see Behrendt 2000). With a closer look at the importance of the private 
insurance in the public pension system respectively with respect to their share in 
pension benefits, two facts can be observed:   
 
1. The relative importance of private insurance is especially high in countries 
with basic pension systems, as here private insurance secures the living 
standard. In those countries (Denmark, Sweden and Great Britain) private 
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insurance is obligatory. In addition to other retirement payments, they (often 
company pensions) will secure the living standard. However, considerable 
deviations can be seen in the rate of the private insurance from gross income. 
In Sweden, the Netherlands and Great Britain about 70-80% of the 
population are insured privately, but individual rates are very different. 
Sweden has the lowest proportional rate with about 20%, Great Britain has 
about 35% and in the Netherlands a proportional part within the retirement 
payments is about 40%. 
2. Secondly, the following has to be taken into account: In all countries, with the 
exception of Sweden, we can see a strong connection between private 
insurance and a generally high income. Here the differences in old-age income 
become very obvious, especially if the redistribution is totally dependent on 
capital-coverage. This connection, however, is not obligatory. Some examples 
(like Finland, or in some respects also Sweden, see Behrendt 2000) show that 
an effective control and the use of institutional distribution-factors can work 
quite well. Private capital-covered insurances do therefore not necessarily 
mean the continuation of an inequality created during the working-life, but 
can be combined with elements of solidarity.  
 
Some gender-specific remarks  
 
Problems of capital-covered additional insurances become obvious, if one 
looks at the pension system from a gender perspective. In this context the close 
connection to employment becomes clear. The average contributions to the 
private insurance until the retirement age are about 50% higher from men than 
from women. This is true for all examined countries. Only in Germany we can 
find a difference, but this can be put down to generous regulations concerning 
widows’ pensions (especially in Germany the percentage of women with 
employment is low and most women work only part-time). This also means that 
in countries in which more women are employed like in the Netherlands or in 
Sweden, the inequality in the received pension payments, like inequality in 
wages, is not counter-balanced (see Fuhrmannn in this volume; for the 





Table 1: Overview over the characteristics of six European pension systems 
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2. Current reforms in the selected EU-countries 
 
In this section reforms in the pension systems of the countries described 
above shall be examined and analysed further. It is not a description of the 
current “popular” discussion. Rather we choose a wider perspective to gain new 
insights into the reform-activities of the selected countries and to describe their 




The Swedish reform-activity is based on a broad discussion, which started 
in the 1980s, as the current system was checked for reform-requirements and 
reform-possibilities. After a general approval of the parliament, detailed 
elaborations of the reform were started in 1994. In 1998, ten years after the 
beginning of the public discussion, the parliament passed the respective law for 
these reforms. In 2002 the first payments according to the new system will be 
made (For a more detailed description of the Swedish reforms see 
http://www.pension.gov.se). 
 
An important impulse for the reform process was the expected funding-
problems caused by growing economic problems, an increased life expectancy, 
and as a result a worsening ratio between payers and receivers of contributions. 
This would get even more dramatic as the unemployment-rate grew and the 
economic growth stagnated. Also new ideas and demands played a crucial role in 
the reform process, such as the increasing complaints about the missing 
correlation between the income (and the paid contributions) and the resulting 
level of pension payments. 
 
The new Swedish pension system can be described as follows: 
 
 need-orientated basic retirement payments 
 individualisation of pension entitlements 
 higher flexibility for the retirement age 
 a priority shift from the predictability of the level of the payments to finance-
security  
 gradual introduction of the new system 
 
Everyone is entitled to a guaranteed minimum-pension; further possible 
supplements include means-tested housing benefits. The basis for the 
calculation of the minimum-pension is a fixed point of reference. The emerging 
costs are financed by the national budget, and the pension fund is not burdened. 
The responsibility is now more on the side of the individual; only those in need 
receive a basic pension.  
 
The new pension system tries to create more transparency. Especially the 
connection between income, contributions and the level of pension payments will 
be more visible. Out of the 18,5% of the contributions from income, 16% go 
directly into the pension fund whereas 2,5% go onto a different account. The 16% 
are used directly for the pensions of the older generation. So contributions are 
directly redistributed, and governmental subsidies are excluded. This makes it 
nearly impossible to predict the future level of the benefits. In general one 
expects that the level will decrease as the number of beneficiaries in the system 
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grows. One´s own pension is the result of the paid contributions compared to the 
contributions of the other pensioners. The contributions, which are collected on a 
special account, go directly into the pension-income of the individual; all received 
interest are later added to the pension payments. So, it is a capital-covered 
component in an allocation-financed system. Simultaneously, the possibility to 
have a decision-right about the investment of the money, might improve the 
yield.  
 
There is no fixed retirement age within the new system. A lower limit was 
defined but not an upper one. 61 is the earliest age to receive a pension. 
However, everyone has the possibility to work for a longer time and thereby 
increase the entitlement for the retirement payments. Also, it is now possible to 
receive a part-pension in varying amounts. The new system is relatively immune 
against a further increase in life-expectancy, as this was taken into account right 
from the beginning. If life-expectancy grows, pensions will decrease; also the 
demographic change is excluded as an critical factor. The economic growth, 
respectively the development of incomes, is taken into account for the calculation 
of the annuity rate. (for a very complicated calculation of the annuity rate, see 
Scherman 1998: 421) 
 
Because the introduction of the new pension system has been 
implemented step by step, a very smooth transition from the old to the new 
system will be assured. For every one-year age-group between 1938 and 1953 the 
elements of the old and the new systems are combined with a different emphasis. 
People born in 1954 will be the first to receive a pension fully in accordance with 




Recent reforms in the Danish pension system took place with respect to 
nearly all areas and the reforms continue. These trends are as follows: 
 
• Introduction of a capital covered additional pension with reallocation-
elements 
• Reduction of the retirement age with a simultaneous reduction of the 
number of receivers of special retirement payments 
• Strengthening of occupational pension and  private pension insurance 
 
With these reforms the future level of pensions will increasingly differ, as 
the benefits from occupational pensions and the private insurances are closely 
connected to the level of income during the working life. Thus, the principle of 
income maintenance has gained importance compared to basic safeguards. 
 
This can also be seen in the permanent introduction of a third public 
pillar. By the special payments of 1% of the gross income every insured person 
and also the unemployed and the social welfare recipients build up an account. 
From the age of 65 on every person receives a monthly payment in proportion to 
the made contributions. The allocation-thought is thereby not neglected as the 
received benefits are not to exceed the average sum of the paid contributions. 
This new element of the Danish pension system was first introduced in 1997 and 




For all pensioners born in 1938 and later, the retirement age was reduced 
from 67 to 65 years; at the same time early retirement was made unattractive in 
order to keep more elderly people in the labour market. Some other new 
regulations reduce the payments when an income is earned simultaneously to a 
pension; and this should be viewed in a similar context that promotes a longer 
life-working-time on a voluntary basis. 
 
In order to introduce an occupational pension and to increase its 
acceptance, two methods were used. First, a governmental supervision was 
created which manages the funds and which guarantees a greater security for 
the contributions. Secondly, the occupational pension is mostly not charged as 
an income on the basic pension (especially the supplements). With the 
opportunity to keep the pension-entitlement after a change of jobs, the mobility 
in the job-market was increased. As for occupational pensions, private retirement 
insurance benefits are not seen as an income. The attractiveness of the private 
pension-funds was even increased when flexible contribution-payments and tax-
privileges were introduced.  
 
One further trend of the reforms is to reduce the number of people who 
receive an additional income. With changes in the social-pension law, the 
financial incentive to (re)enter the job-market reduces the number of recipients of 
early retirement payments. These changes also include a reduction of benefits if 
one retires at an early age. 
 
c) The Netherlands 
 
Since the 1990s the Netherlands have undertaken several reforms of the 
pension system, which are aiming to reduce both legal claims and benefits. This 
fact follows the idea of a general insurance-systems that shall only secure basic 
needs. The following trends can be observed:  
 
 the basic principles of the systems were only slightly changed 
 the occupational pension could keep its freedom of investment, although a 
limited number of governmental interference took place 
 the survivorship annuity was newly regulated and strongly restricted 
 the unemployment insurance was reduced in its benefits and partly privatised  
 
The Netherlands do not try to solve the expected financing-problem by 
drastic changes within the system. Rather it has introduced a number of small 
reforms to cover the costs of an ageing population. The government uses three 
strategies: one strategy is to enlarge the working population, a second strategy is 
to  reduce the national debt and a third strategy helps the financing of the 
system by a slight increase of the contributions, via taxes and via a fund that is 
financed through the national budget which should cover the expected deficit 
from the year 2020 on.  
 
The payments for pensioners with a partner below 65 years of age were 
slightly reduced. The basic payments were cut, but with a low income of a 
partner it is now possible to receive higher extra payments.  
 
The occupational pension is financed by occupational and sector-specific 
funds. As there are nearly no governmental restrictions for the investment, most 
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investments with an expected high yield like shares are chosen. In some respects 
the state intervenes: it is now possible to keep pension-claims after a change of 
job, also the regulation for men and women, full-time and part-time workers have 
been harmonised (Twaalhoven 1998: 394). 
 
In 1996 the survivorship annuity was newly regulated, the partner- no 
matter if a spouse or living-in partner or even a sibling- has a right to a 
survivorship annuity, if he or she has a child below 18 years of age, is up to 45% 
unemployable or has been born before 1950. In fact, this was an abolishment of 
the survivorship annuity for almost every person born after 1950.  
 
One emphasis of the reforms was the conversion of the disability pension 
(see Stillich 1999b). The benefits were restricted during the last years and 
disability was newly defined. Self-employed and civil servants were integrated 
into the system. The employers have now to pay all the contributions, but they 
can reduce the level of payments if they assume parts of the unemployment-risk 
and pay for a private insurance. This counts for a partial privatisation of the 
system. At the same time the self-responsibility of employees was enhanced and 
the system was put on a wider base. Altogether the Netherlands have shown a 
decisive will to reduce the enormous level of disability-payments and to enlarge 
the working-population, especially among the generation of 50-65 year olds.  
 
d) Great Britain 
 
The reforms in Great Britain were mainly undertaken in the following 
three sectors:  
 
• construction of a new second official pension 
• slight corrections of the existing system 
• better regulation of the occupational and the private retirement payments 
 
At the end of 1999 as a part of a broader reform some aspects of the 
existing pension-system were changed. The aim was to change the precarious 
situation of a lot of poor pensioners, as the retirement payments had been hardly 
adapted to inflation for at least the past 15 years. Also, there had to be reforms 
because of the decreasing importance of SERPS as a lot of employees had already 
left this system.  
 
The new system includes requirement-independent minimum pensions. 
The previous second column of SERPS has been replaced by the so-called State 
Second Pension (SSP). The aim of this new pension is to improve the financial 
situation of low-income workers at an old age. It is aiming mainly at people with 
an annual income below GBP 21.600. Additionally, new pensions for interest 
groups has been created. Here persons with a low income can build up pension-
claims, which are grant-aided and are covered by accumulated capital.  
 
Minor reforms are advanced information via annual retirement-payments 
accounts, additional benefits for the television licence fees or visual tests, or 
newly regulated pension payments after a divorce, as the pension-claims are now 
treated like other property and are shared, for example after a divorce. The 




Reforms of the occupational and private insurance have only had a 
regulating character. Because of the Maxwell-scandal, the controls of the 
occupational pension funds have been intensified. Additionally, employees are 
included in the control mechanisms. The private insurance is now controlled 
more strictly. In the past the proceeds were very low because of mismanagement 
(Wittrock 1998: 387). Aside from this, new regulations for the level of fees and for 
tax incentives have also been made.  
 
Like in other European countries, there were reforms of special retirement 
payments like those for surviving dependants. In Great Britain the growing equal 
treatment of men and women and the slowly growing level of benefits will 
improve the present situation.  
 
e) France  
 
According to the complexity of the system it is not surprising that the 
reforms of the last years did not really change the existing system. The basic 
problems of the system, like the problematic financial situation and the 
worsening proportion between employees and pensioners were not solved. Slight 
reforms were undertaken in the following fields:  
 
 reduction of the benefits by a spread of the basis for assessment 
 fortification of the private insurance following the capital-covering principle 
 
The major aim has been to freeze the amount of retirement-payments at a 
certain level. Thereby the structure of the system was not changed, but the 
claiming of benefits was restricted. So, the required number for a full pension 
was increased to a total number of 160 insurance-quarters (40 years). Also, the 
number of years for the calculation of the average annual income has been 
increased from 10 to 25 years till the year 2008. Normally, a result of this new 
procedure would be a lower pension-payment. For the consolidation of the 
system a new fund was created, financed by general social contributions.  
 
Since 1998 every employee has the possibility to take part in a pension-
saving-plan. Thereby the employer and the employee make a contract for the 
saving-plan on a voluntary basis. Employer and employee share the 
contributions. The management is done by an insurance, by an insurance-union 
or a co-operative organisation. A pension is paid out of the accumulated capital. 
Therefore, the system has extended an additional possibility to receive a pension, 
in which the state is not directly involved but works according to the capital-
covering principle. This new system is, however, under a substantial pressure for 
reform because financing will not suffice in the wake of all the claims (Financial 
Times Deutschland 14.2.2001, S.12).  
 
For example, the still existing low retirement-age for civil servants can be 
seen as an example for the needs of reform. An important factor why the reform-
needs still exist is the high conflict-readiness of the French trade unions and the 
structure of the political system. 
 




After the change of ruling parties in the government, modifications in the 
pension-systems were cancelled. The main focus was still the financial 
consolidation of the system with a simultaneous  constant level of contributions 
and  pension-payments. The main focus of the reforms are or were:  
 
 financial consolidation of the system 
 introduction of a need-orientated basic security 
 introduction of a partly state-financed private insurance  
 strengthening of the occupational pension 
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To guarantee stable contribution-payments and a stable pension-level, the 
number of contribution-payers has to be increased. Therefore, also people with 
low income and the pseudo-self-employed have to be included in the statutory 
pension insurance. By this and by higher tax-grants, the contributions could be 
stabilised at maximally 19,1%. By a changed modulation of the pension-income, 
the contributions and the level of the retirement-payments should be stabilised. 
The future will show if the existing calculations were reliable and if this is really 
possible.  
 
To guarantee a basic security for pensioners (apart from the social welfare) 
a need-orientated basic pension is planned. This basic pension will be financed 
by taxes and shall be carried out by districts (Kreise).  
 
An important part of the reforms is the introduction of a governmental 
encouraged private insurance. This was planned as an obligatory insurance for 
everyone, but because of great resistance it was changed into a voluntarily one. A 
private insurance with an annual rate of up to 4% of the gross income is 
forthcoming and shall be financed by governmental grants and state allowances; 
both private and occupational funds will be eligible. Which fund-forms will 
receive grants is still in the future. State allowance is dependent on the marital 
status and on the number of children. In special cases the allowance can be up 
to 80%. 
      
The occupational pension was also strengthened. Every employee is now 
entitled to an occupational pension via reward-conversion. In the future claims 
are not lost after a change of job and time limits for the expiration-date have 
been extended.  
 
Finally, some smaller reforms in the social sector were introduced. In 
future will be easier to have parental leave acknowledged both in the pension 
insurance and the surviving dependent-insurance. Via financial incentives the 
re-uptake of an employment (especially part-time) is encouraged.  
 
 
3. Summary and conclusions 
 
In spite of some functional similarities of pension systems and common 
problems (demographic change, unemployment), the above-examined six 
countries have developed different reforms in the pension-systems. In addition, 
none of these current systems represent an ideal case of the “three worlds of 
welfare capitalism” (social-democratic, liberal or conservative) or the Bismarck 
versus Beveridge typology, but all show mixed characteristics. This complexity 
has been reinforced over the last years as more reforms have contributed to 
further diversification of the existing systems; one system dominance (or a “one 
pillar type” system) has lost its dominance. In general, there has been a trend 
towards pension-systems that consists of more than one pillar.  
 
All systems, to different extents, strengthened their occupational pensions 
and private insurance. Individuals have been made more responsible for their 
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pensions and likewise, the government has reduced its own responsibility. 
Problems for the allocation-financed systems like growing life-expectancy can 
explain the trend toward capital-covered systems. Indeed, new pension-systems 
have been created which show elements of allocation and of capital-covered 
procedures. 
 
When viewing these overall trends towards more than one pillar-systems 
and the strengthening of occupational pensions and private insurance, one is 
lead to believe that the European pension-systems are converging. This, however, 
is not correct:  All examined countries held a mix in the character of the chosen 
pension-system, but there was a great variety in the chosen mixture. Some of the 
examined countries had just started to add new elements to their pension system 
that had until recently been dominated by public or other forms of retirement 
payments.  In Great Britain, on the other hand, the pension system was already 
mostly privatized and relied heavily on the occupational pension (For the specific 
problems of the different pension systems like PAYG-systems or privatised 
systems see Holzmann, Robert 2000). The basic pension in Great Britain plays 
only a minor role in all pensions, while private and occupational pension 
schemes are dominate. This mixture could hardly be imaginable in Sweden, 
Denmark or the Netherlands. Also in Germany such a plan would meet with 
broad resistance if there were a shift away from the principle of social insurance 
or even a small new addition to the system. 
 
 
The following is a synopsis of the different paths or reform strategies each 
country chose in their pension systems: 
 
• France, partly Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark have an incremental 
strategy. Here benefits are sporadically cut or countries change the basis for 
their assessment of pensions. This path is consistent with the literature that 
underscores small corridor of reforms in these countries and illustrates the 
tactics of blame avoidance.  
• Many reform-measures in countries are representative of the path-
dependency of the pension-systems. For example, in Scandinavia new 
governmental provisions were introduced for private and occupational 
pensions. The same is true for the privatising of pensions in Great Britain; the 
near-liquidation of SERPS is consistent with a liberal model. Klammer (1998) 
calls this reform „back to the roots.” 
• In some systems, however, a fundamental change can be seen, e.g. Sweden. 
Here the public pension was changed into a basic pension and the whole 
pension-system was arranged in a new way. Yet neither typologies nor 
theories fit very well together in this case. It seems that a combination of 
problem awareness and willingness to act has played an important role in 
overcoming policy traditions and institutional restrictions. 
 
Another important point, especially from a German point of view, is the 
different weight that is given to the economy, especially the labor-market. The 
connection between contributions, additional wage-costs, and effects on the 
labor-market is in no other country more significant than in Germany. In other 
countries the discussion on the demographic change and the resulting problems 




These conclusions make it obvious that although the trends of the 
compared reforms are similar, no two reforms are really the same. In every case 
the national background has to be taken into account; especially the existing 
pension-system as a starting point of the reforms is very important. Indeed, the 
categorization of the different systems according to Esping-Andersen gets 
increasingly difficult. For example, the social-democratic systems have adjusted 
their pension-system to the other existing types and decided on profound 
reforms. Indeed, other elements of the welfare-states, like labor-market politics, 
the health system, social services or education need to be taken into account in 
order to gain a full picture of these trends.  
 
Conservative models show a lower readiness or ability for reform, which 
may be partly due to the autonomous insurance-systems. The structure of the 
political systems is important: in countries like France or Germany, where we 
find party coalitions in government and a federal state architecture, reforms are 
more difficult. Therefore, pension-system reforms and other such elements of the 
welfare-state are possible but not likely (see Cox in this volume). 
 
Having examined the reform activities of other countries, which lessons 
can be drawn for Germany? Reform-policies can be easily adapted if the political 
systems are very similar. For Germany that means primarily a comparison with 
other conservative welfare-states. Here the structures are so similar that positive 
experiences can be implemented more easily. This is true for the strengthening of 
minimum-securing elements like in the Netherlands or the enhancement of 
family-policy aspects as in France.  
 
The aims of the reforms but not the specific measures are important in 
evaluating the systems, as we have found in examining other countries. 
Especially Sweden, the “Mecca” of welfare-states (and welfare-state research), has 
significantly changed its “instruments”, but it has never changed the aim of a 
far-reaching universal security for all. This is also true for some aspects of the 
private pension-insurance, where concrete characteristics are important.  
 
Our comparison of pension reforms and the resulting variance in welfare-
state systems shows that there are different ways of reforming the welfare-state 
and such systems can adapt to new social circumstances with a variety of 
reforms. New policies take into consideration the legacy of the evolved pension-
system and current socio-economic problems but they are not totally restricted 
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